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Article 9 Freedom of thought, conscience and religion 1Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. • Absolute right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion includes freedom to change religion and practice it alone or in community. • Qualified right to manifest religion or belief – can be restricted if • Prescribed by law, • Pursues a legitimate aim e.g., public safety, order, health, morals, or rights of others, and • Proportionate means to that aim. Key Cases • Kokkinakis v Greece 1994 – Recognised freedom of religion as fundamental to a democratic society, protecting not just believers but also atheists and agnostics. Jehovah’s Witness convicted in Greece for attempting to convert people to his faith law for “proselytism”—engaging in efforts to persuade others to join his religious group. Kokkinakis argued that this violated his right to freedom of religion under Article 9 and ECtHR agreed that Greece had not justified breach. • Williamson v Education Secretary 2005 – Parents and teachers at private Christian schools challenged a ban on corporal punishment regarded by many at the time as an integral theme of Christianity, arguing it violated their Article 9 right to manifest religious beliefs. HoL accepted that the policy was a manifestation of belief but held that the interference was justified. The ban was prescribed by law, pursued the legitimate aim of protecting children from physical punishment, and was proportionate since Parliament could decide that a universal ban was in children’s best interests. Restrictions • Workplace and schools – Restrictions on religious expression e.g., clothing bans, required duties have been challenged, raising questions about the limits of religious manifestation. The workplace The leading case on restrictions that may lawfully be imposed in the workplace is Eweida and others v United Kingdom 2013 In this case, four separate applicants argued that their respective employers had either imposed restrictions on dress or dismissed them in violation of their rights under Article 9. a Eweida had been employed by British Airways. She wanted to wear a cross as a sign of her commitment to the Christian faith. Between September 2006 and February 2007, she was not allowed to remain in her post whilst visibly wearing the cross. b Chaplin was a Christian who had worn a cross since 1971. She had been employed as a nurse by an NHS trust. Her employer’s uniform policy prohibited the wearing of necklaces to reduce the risk of injury when handling patients. When she refused to remove the cross and chain she was wearing, she was moved to a nonnursing post, which shortly thereafter ceased to exist. c Lavelle had been employed by a local authority as a registrar of births, deaths and marriages. She was a Christian and believed that samesex civil partnerships were contrary to God’s law. She refused to be designated as a registrar of civil partnerships, which resulted in disciplinary proceedings and the loss of her job. d MacFarlane, a Christian, had been employed by Relate – a marriage guidance organisation – which had a policy of requiring staff to provide services equally to heterosexual and homosexual couples. He refused to commit himself to providing psychosexual counselling to samesex couples, which resulted in disciplinary proceedings being brought against him. The ECtHR considered each application in turn a Eweida – the Court found that a fair balance had not been struck. On one side of the argument was Eweida’s desire to manifest her religious belief. On the other was the employer’s wish to project a certain corporate image. Whilst the Court accepted that this aim was legitimate, it said that the domestic courts had accorded it too much weight. Eweida’s cross was discreet and could not have detracted from her professional appearance, and there was no evidence that the wearing of other, previously authorised, items of religious clothing by other employees had had any negative impact on British Airways’ brand or image. The Court found that the domestic authorities had failed to sufficiently protect Eweida’s right to manifest her religion, in breach of their positive obligation under Article 9. b Chaplin – the Court found that the reason for asking Chaplin to remove her cross – namely the protection of health and safety on a hospital ward – was much more important than the reason given to Eweida. The Court also said that hospital managers were better placed to make decisions about clinical safety than a court. The measures were therefore not disproportionate. It followed that the relevant interference with her freedom to manifest her religion was necessary in a democratic society and that there had been no breach of Article 9. c Lavelle – the Court accepted that, given the strength of Lavelle’s religious conviction, she considered that she had no choice but to face disciplinary action and ultimately lose her job, rather than be designated a civil partnership registrar. On the other hand, the local authority’s policy aimed to secure the rights of others, which were also protected under the Convention. The Court said that national authorities should be given a wide margin of appreciation when it came to striking a balance between competing Convention rights. Therefore, the local authority that brought the disciplinary proceedings and the domestic courts that had rejected Lavelle’s claim had not violated Article 9. d MacFarlane – the Court accepted that the loss of his job was a severe sanction with grave consequences for MacFarlane. However, the most important factor was that the employer’s action was intended to secure the implementation of its policy of providing a service without discrimination. The state authorities should be given a wide margin of appreciation in deciding where to strike the balance between MacFarlane’s right to manifest his religious belief and the employer’s interest in securing the rights of others. The refusal by the domestic courts to uphold MacFarlane’s complaints therefore did not give rise to a breach of Article 9. Schools R Begum v Denbigh High School 2006 A Muslim schoolgirl, Shabina Begum, was excluded for refusing to comply with the school’s uniform policy, which required a shalwar kameez less concealing as opposed to her preference a jilbab. She argued this violated her Article 9 right to manifest her religion. HoL ruled there was no violation. The school’s uniform policy had been carefully designed to respect and accommodate Muslim beliefs in an inclusive, unthreatening and uncompetitive way and the rules were acceptable to mainstream Muslim opinion. Moreover, Begum had initially accepted the uniform and had other school options that allowed the jilbab. The school’s policy was considered justified to prevent pressure on other students and division. The interference, if any, was deemed proportionate.